fix(cdp): gate Target.createTarget file:// like Page.navigate

GHSA-q55h-vfv9-qcr5 patched Page.navigate to refuse file:// URLs
unless --allow-file-access was set, but Target.createTarget accepted
the same scheme and called page.navigate(url) directly, bypassing
the policy. A CDP client could call Target.createTarget {url: file://...}
then Runtime.evaluate to read document.body.textContent and recover
arbitrary local files.

Apply the same gate at the Target.createTarget entrypoint. Pull
the file-scheme detector into a shared util module so both domains
stay in lock-step instead of one drifting from the other.

Verified blocked vs the unpatched build (pr69):
  - Patched: Target.createTarget {url: file:///tmp/secret} errors
    "Target.createTarget to file:// is disabled. ..." before any
    navigation runs.
  - Unpatched: same call returns the file contents via
    Runtime.evaluate {expression: "document.body.textContent"}.
This commit is contained in:
SGavrl committed 2026-05-16 15:26:58 +00:00
1 parent 935cb5c0da
commit 3158a1fd31
4 files changed
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@@ -3,14 +3,7 @@ use serde_json::{json, Value};
use crate::dispatch::CdpContext;
use crate::types::CdpEvent;
fn url_is_file_scheme(raw: &str) -> bool {
url::Url::parse(raw)
.map(|u| u.scheme().eq_ignore_ascii_case("file"))
.unwrap_or_else(|_| {
raw.trim_start().to_ascii_lowercase().starts_with("file:")
})
}
use crate::util::url_is_file_scheme;
pub async fn handle(
method: &str,