GHSA-q55h-vfv9-qcr5. Any process able to reach the CDP port could
send Page.navigate {"url":"file:///etc/shadow"} and read arbitrary
local files (the process's UID's worth of read access). When obscura
runs as root inside Docker or as a systemd service that translates
straight into /etc/shadow, /root/.ssh/id_rsa, /proc/1/environ, etc.
Validate at the CDP boundary, not in obscura-net, so direct CLI
callers ("obscura fetch file://...") keep working. A new
BrowserContext.allow_file_access flag defaults to false; Page.navigate
returns an error when the requested URL is file:// and the flag is
off. CdpContext::new_with_security threads the flag from the server
entry point, and "obscura serve --allow-file-access" opts in for
local-HTML testing workflows.
Tested:
- Default obscura serve: CDP Page.navigate {file:///etc/passwd} ->
refused with descriptive error.
- obscura serve --allow-file-access: same call succeeds.
- obscura fetch file://... CLI path: unchanged, still reads the file.
- All earlier PoCs (GHSA-6pj9 JS->file SOP, GHSA-4789 sub-resource
SSRF, GHSA-4789 CSS template injection) still pass.
- cargo test --workspace clean.
SGavrl
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