Files
obscura/crates/obscura-net/src/client.rs
T
Andrey Mnatsakanov 86e6d5ce15 fix(net): treat empty SSL_CERT_FILE/SSL_CERT_DIR as unset in the stealth client
The stealth (wreq) client gated its custom-trust-store build on
`var_os(...).is_some()`, which is true for a set-but-empty variable. Supplying
a store to wreq's `tls_cert_store` REPLACES the bundled webpki roots, so an
empty `SSL_CERT_FILE` (a common shell accident, e.g. `export SSL_CERT_FILE=$UNSET`)
built a near-empty default-paths store and made every HTTPS request fail with
CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED -- while the reqwest client, which already filters
empty values in configured_root_paths(), kept working. Same input, opposite
behavior.

Extract a shared `custom_cert_store_requested` predicate in client.rs that
applies the same `!is_empty()` filter, and call it from the stealth client's
guard. The predicate takes the values as arguments so it is unit-tested under
default features (the stealth feature pulls in boringssl and is not built in
the normal test job).

Fixes #551
2026-08-04 11:08:28 +02:00

1064 lines
40 KiB
Rust

use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::{Arc, OnceLock};
use std::time::Duration;
use std::net::{IpAddr, SocketAddr};
use reqwest::dns::{Addrs, Name, Resolve, Resolving};
use reqwest::header::{HeaderMap, HeaderName, HeaderValue, USER_AGENT};
use reqwest::redirect::Policy;
use reqwest::{Client, Method};
use tokio::sync::RwLock;
use url::Url;
use crate::cookies::CookieJar;
use crate::interceptor::{InterceptAction, RequestInterceptor};
fn configured_root_paths() -> Vec<std::path::PathBuf> {
let mut paths = Vec::new();
if let Some(path) = std::env::var_os("SSL_CERT_FILE").filter(|path| !path.is_empty()) {
paths.push(path.into());
}
if let Some(directory) = std::env::var_os("SSL_CERT_DIR").filter(|path| !path.is_empty()) {
match std::fs::read_dir(directory) {
Ok(entries) => {
paths.extend(entries.filter_map(|entry| entry.ok().map(|entry| entry.path())));
}
Err(error) => {
tracing::warn!(%error, "failed to read SSL_CERT_DIR");
}
}
}
paths.sort();
paths
}
fn configured_root_certificates() -> &'static [reqwest::Certificate] {
static ROOTS: OnceLock<Vec<reqwest::Certificate>> = OnceLock::new();
ROOTS.get_or_init(|| {
let mut certificates = Vec::new();
for path in configured_root_paths() {
let bytes = match std::fs::read(&path) {
Ok(bytes) => bytes,
Err(error) => {
tracing::warn!(%error, path = %path.display(), "failed to read CA certificate file");
continue;
}
};
match reqwest::Certificate::from_pem_bundle(&bytes) {
Ok(mut bundle) if !bundle.is_empty() => certificates.append(&mut bundle),
_ => match reqwest::Certificate::from_der(&bytes) {
Ok(certificate) => certificates.push(certificate),
Err(error) => {
tracing::warn!(%error, path = %path.display(), "failed to parse CA certificate file");
}
},
}
}
certificates
})
}
/// Whether SSL_CERT_FILE / SSL_CERT_DIR request a custom TLS trust store. A
/// variable that is set but empty (e.g. `SSL_CERT_FILE=""`, a common shell
/// accident) is treated as unset, matching the `!is_empty()` filter in
/// `configured_root_paths` above. The stealth client (wreq) relies on this:
/// supplying a store to `tls_cert_store` REPLACES the bundled webpki roots, so
/// an empty value would otherwise build a near-empty store and break all HTTPS.
///
/// The only non-test caller is the stealth (wreq) client, so a plain build
/// without the `stealth` feature sees it as unused.
#[cfg_attr(not(feature = "stealth"), allow(dead_code))]
pub(crate) fn custom_cert_store_requested(
cert_file: Option<&std::ffi::OsStr>,
cert_dir: Option<&std::ffi::OsStr>,
) -> bool {
cert_file.is_some_and(|v| !v.is_empty()) || cert_dir.is_some_and(|v| !v.is_empty())
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct Response {
pub url: Url,
pub status: u16,
pub headers: HashMap<String, String>,
pub body: Vec<u8>,
pub redirected_from: Vec<Url>,
}
impl Response {
/// Decode the body as text, honoring the response charset.
///
/// Uses the HTTP `Content-Type` header's `charset=` parameter, then for
/// HTML responses falls back to sniffing `<meta charset>` in the first
/// 1KB, then UTF-8. Mirrors browser behaviour per the HTML5 spec.
pub fn text(&self) -> String {
if self.is_html() {
crate::encoding::decode_response(&self.body, self.content_type())
} else {
crate::encoding::decode_non_html(&self.body, self.content_type())
}
}
pub fn header(&self, name: &str) -> Option<&str> {
self.headers.get(&name.to_lowercase()).map(|s| s.as_str())
}
pub fn content_type(&self) -> Option<&str> {
self.header("content-type")
}
pub fn is_html(&self) -> bool {
self.content_type()
.map(|ct| ct.contains("text/html"))
.unwrap_or(false)
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct RequestInfo {
pub url: Url,
pub method: String,
pub headers: HashMap<String, String>,
pub resource_type: ResourceType,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ResourceType {
Document,
Script,
Stylesheet,
Image,
Font,
Xhr,
Fetch,
Other,
}
pub type RequestCallback = Arc<dyn Fn(&RequestInfo) + Send + Sync>;
pub type ResponseCallback = Arc<dyn Fn(&RequestInfo, &Response) + Send + Sync>;
/// Page-scoped store for the passive on_request/on_response callbacks (issue
/// #408). Each `Page` owns one, so a callback never fires for another page's
/// requests and dies with its page. The HTTP client itself stays
/// callback-free; page-driven fetches pass the page's registry in. Ids keep
/// the `u64` shape #416 established on `Page::on_request`/`on_response`.
pub struct CallbackRegistry {
on_request: RwLock<Vec<(u64, RequestCallback)>>,
on_response: RwLock<Vec<(u64, ResponseCallback)>>,
id_counter: std::sync::atomic::AtomicU64,
}
impl CallbackRegistry {
pub fn new() -> Self {
CallbackRegistry {
on_request: RwLock::new(Vec::new()),
on_response: RwLock::new(Vec::new()),
id_counter: std::sync::atomic::AtomicU64::new(1),
}
}
fn next_id(&self) -> u64 {
self.id_counter
.fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed)
}
/// Register a request callback; the returned id detaches it via
/// `remove_request`. Sync like the pre-registry push path: registration
/// happens from `Page` setup where no reader holds the lock, so
/// `try_write` cannot fail there.
pub fn add_request(&self, cb: RequestCallback) -> u64 {
let id = self.next_id();
if let Ok(mut v) = self.on_request.try_write() {
v.push((id, cb));
}
id
}
/// Register a response callback; see `add_request`.
pub fn add_response(&self, cb: ResponseCallback) -> u64 {
let id = self.next_id();
if let Ok(mut v) = self.on_response.try_write() {
v.push((id, cb));
}
id
}
/// Detach a request callback. Returns true when the id was found and
/// removed, so a double detach is a visible no-op.
pub fn remove_request(&self, id: u64) -> bool {
match self.on_request.try_write() {
Ok(mut v) => {
let before = v.len();
v.retain(|(cid, _)| *cid != id);
v.len() != before
}
Err(_) => false,
}
}
/// Detach a response callback; see `remove_request`.
pub fn remove_response(&self, id: u64) -> bool {
match self.on_response.try_write() {
Ok(mut v) => {
let before = v.len();
v.retain(|(cid, _)| *cid != id);
v.len() != before
}
Err(_) => false,
}
}
/// True when at least one request callback is registered. Lets fire sites
/// skip building a `RequestInfo` when nobody listens.
pub async fn has_request_callbacks(&self) -> bool {
!self.on_request.read().await.is_empty()
}
/// True when at least one response callback is registered.
pub async fn has_response_callbacks(&self) -> bool {
!self.on_response.read().await.is_empty()
}
pub async fn fire_request(&self, info: &RequestInfo) {
for (_, cb) in self.on_request.read().await.iter() {
cb(info);
}
}
pub async fn fire_response(&self, info: &RequestInfo, resp: &Response) {
for (_, cb) in self.on_response.read().await.iter() {
cb(info, resp);
}
}
}
impl Default for CallbackRegistry {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::new()
}
}
/// Process-wide opt-in via env var. Older flow that issue #4 introduced. The
/// new `--allow-private-network` CLI flag (issue #33) sets a per-client field
/// that is OR'd with this so existing scripts and Docker setups that pin the
/// env var keep working unchanged.
pub fn env_allows_private_network() -> bool {
matches!(
std::env::var("OBSCURA_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK")
.ok()
.as_deref()
.map(str::trim)
.map(str::to_ascii_lowercase)
.as_deref(),
Some("1") | Some("true") | Some("yes") | Some("on")
)
}
/// True when `ip` must never be the target of an outbound request from the
/// engine: loopback, RFC1918 private, link-local (incl. the 169.254.169.254
/// cloud-metadata endpoint), broadcast, documentation, the unspecified address
/// (0.0.0.0 / ::, which the OS routes to localhost), IPv6 unique-local
/// (fc00::/7), and any IPv4-mapped/compatible IPv6 form of the above.
/// Centralizes the SSRF deny-set so the literal-host check and the
/// DNS-resolution check (`SsrfGuardResolver`) can never disagree.
pub fn is_forbidden_ip(ip: IpAddr) -> bool {
match ip {
IpAddr::V4(v4) => {
v4.is_loopback()
|| v4.is_private()
|| v4.is_link_local()
|| v4.is_broadcast()
|| v4.is_documentation()
|| v4.is_unspecified()
}
IpAddr::V6(v6) => {
if v6.is_loopback()
|| v6.is_unspecified()
|| v6.is_unique_local()
|| v6.is_unicast_link_local()
{
return true;
}
// Unwrap IPv4-mapped (::ffff:a.b.c.d) and IPv4-compatible (::a.b.c.d)
// forms and re-check the embedded v4 so e.g. [::ffff:127.0.0.1] or
// [::ffff:169.254.169.254] cannot slip past the v6 arm.
if let Some(v4) = v6.to_ipv4_mapped().or_else(|| v6.to_ipv4()) {
return is_forbidden_ip(IpAddr::V4(v4));
}
false
}
}
}
/// reqwest DNS resolver that performs the lookup and then rejects the whole
/// request if ANY resolved address is in the SSRF deny-set. This closes the
/// DNS-rebinding bypass a host-string check alone cannot: a public name that
/// resolves to 127.0.0.1 / 169.254.169.254 / an RFC1918 address is blocked at
/// connect time, using the very addresses reqwest will dial. When private
/// access is permitted (`--allow-private-network` or
/// `OBSCURA_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK`) the lookup passes through unfiltered.
pub struct SsrfGuardResolver {
allow_private: bool,
}
impl SsrfGuardResolver {
pub fn new(allow_private: bool) -> Self {
Self { allow_private }
}
}
impl Resolve for SsrfGuardResolver {
fn resolve(&self, name: Name) -> Resolving {
let allow = self.allow_private || env_allows_private_network();
let host = name.as_str().to_string();
Box::pin(async move {
let addrs: Vec<SocketAddr> = tokio::net::lookup_host((host.as_str(), 0))
.await
.map_err(|e| -> Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync> { Box::new(e) })?
.collect();
if !allow {
if let Some(bad) = addrs.iter().find(|sa| is_forbidden_ip(sa.ip())) {
return Err(format!(
"SSRF blocked: '{}' resolves to forbidden address {}",
host,
bad.ip()
)
.into());
}
}
let iter: Addrs = Box::new(addrs.into_iter());
Ok(iter)
})
}
}
fn validate_url(url: &Url, allow_private_network: bool) -> Result<(), ObscuraNetError> {
let allow_private_network = allow_private_network || env_allows_private_network();
let scheme = url.scheme();
if scheme != "http" && scheme != "https" && scheme != "file" {
return Err(ObscuraNetError::Network(format!(
"Forbidden URL scheme '{}' - only http, https, and file are allowed",
scheme
)));
}
if scheme == "file" || allow_private_network {
return Ok(());
}
if let Some(host) = url.host() {
match host {
url::Host::Ipv4(ip) => {
if is_forbidden_ip(IpAddr::V4(ip)) {
return Err(ObscuraNetError::Network(format!(
"Access to private/internal IP address {} is not allowed",
ip
)));
}
}
url::Host::Ipv6(ip) => {
if is_forbidden_ip(IpAddr::V6(ip)) {
return Err(ObscuraNetError::Network(format!(
"Access to private/internal IPv6 address {} is not allowed",
ip
)));
}
}
url::Host::Domain(domain) => {
let lower_domain = domain.to_lowercase();
if lower_domain == "localhost"
|| lower_domain.ends_with(".localhost")
|| lower_domain == "127.0.0.1"
|| lower_domain == "::1"
{
return Err(ObscuraNetError::Network(format!(
"Access to localhost domain '{}' is not allowed",
domain
)));
}
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
async fn fetch_file_url(url: &Url) -> Result<Response, ObscuraNetError> {
let path = url
.to_file_path()
.map_err(|_| ObscuraNetError::Network("Invalid file URL".to_string()))?;
let body = tokio::fs::read(&path)
.await
.map_err(|e| ObscuraNetError::Network(format!("Failed to read file: {}", e)))?;
let mut headers = HashMap::new();
if let Some(ext) = path.extension().and_then(|e| e.to_str()) {
let ct = match ext.to_lowercase().as_str() {
"html" | "htm" => "text/html",
"css" => "text/css",
"js" | "mjs" => "application/javascript",
"json" => "application/json",
"png" => "image/png",
"jpg" | "jpeg" => "image/jpeg",
"gif" => "image/gif",
"svg" => "image/svg+xml",
"webp" => "image/webp",
"ico" => "image/x-icon",
_ => "application/octet-stream",
};
headers.insert("content-type".to_string(), ct.to_string());
}
Ok(Response {
url: url.clone(),
status: 200,
headers,
body,
redirected_from: Vec::new(),
})
}
pub struct ObscuraHttpClient {
client: tokio::sync::OnceCell<Client>,
proxy_url: Option<String>,
pub cookie_jar: Arc<CookieJar>,
pub user_agent: RwLock<String>,
pub extra_headers: RwLock<HashMap<String, String>>,
pub interceptor: RwLock<Option<Box<dyn RequestInterceptor + Send + Sync>>>,
pub timeout: Duration,
pub in_flight: Arc<std::sync::atomic::AtomicU32>,
pub block_trackers: bool,
/// When true, `validate_url` lets localhost / RFC1918 / link-local addresses
/// through in addition to the `OBSCURA_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK` env var.
/// Set via `--allow-private-network` on the CLI (issue #33).
pub allow_private_network: bool,
}
/// Derive the sec-ch-ua and sec-ch-ua-platform client-hint header values from a
/// User-Agent string, using Chromium's per-major-version GREASE algorithm so
/// the non-stealth HTTP path agrees with navigator.userAgentData instead of
/// shipping a fixed Linux/Chrome-145 hint that contradicts a Windows profile.
fn chrome_client_hints(ua: &str) -> (String, String) {
let major: usize = ua
.split("Chrome/")
.nth(1)
.and_then(|s| s.split('.').next())
.and_then(|s| s.parse::<usize>().ok())
.unwrap_or(145);
const GREASE_CHARS: [char; 11] = [' ', '(', ':', '-', '.', '/', ')', ';', '=', '?', '_'];
const GREASE_VER: [&str; 3] = ["8", "99", "24"];
const PERMS: [[usize; 3]; 6] = [[0, 1, 2], [0, 2, 1], [1, 0, 2], [1, 2, 0], [2, 0, 1], [2, 1, 0]];
let grease_brand = format!(
"Not{}A{}Brand",
GREASE_CHARS[major % 11],
GREASE_CHARS[(major + 1) % 11]
);
let brands = [
(grease_brand, GREASE_VER[major % 3].to_string()),
("Chromium".to_string(), major.to_string()),
("Google Chrome".to_string(), major.to_string()),
];
let p = PERMS[major % 6];
let sec_ch_ua = p
.iter()
.map(|&i| format!("\"{}\";v=\"{}\"", brands[i].0, brands[i].1))
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join(", ");
let platform = if ua.contains("Windows NT") {
"\"Windows\""
} else if ua.contains("Macintosh") {
"\"macOS\""
} else {
"\"Linux\""
};
(sec_ch_ua, platform.to_string())
}
impl ObscuraHttpClient {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self::with_cookie_jar(Arc::new(CookieJar::new()))
}
pub fn with_cookie_jar(cookie_jar: Arc<CookieJar>) -> Self {
Self::with_options(cookie_jar, None)
}
pub fn with_options(cookie_jar: Arc<CookieJar>, proxy_url: Option<&str>) -> Self {
Self::with_full_options(cookie_jar, proxy_url, false)
}
pub fn with_full_options(
cookie_jar: Arc<CookieJar>,
proxy_url: Option<&str>,
allow_private_network: bool,
) -> Self {
ObscuraHttpClient {
client: tokio::sync::OnceCell::new(),
proxy_url: proxy_url.map(|s| s.to_string()),
cookie_jar,
user_agent: RwLock::new(
"Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/145.0.0.0 Safari/537.36".to_string(),
),
extra_headers: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
interceptor: RwLock::new(None),
in_flight: Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicU32::new(0)),
timeout: Duration::from_secs(30),
block_trackers: false,
allow_private_network,
}
}
async fn get_client(&self) -> &Client {
self.client.get_or_init(|| async {
let mut builder = Client::builder()
.redirect(Policy::none())
.timeout(Duration::from_secs(30))
.danger_accept_invalid_certs(false)
// SSRF guard: reject hostnames that resolve to a private/loopback IP.
.dns_resolver(Arc::new(SsrfGuardResolver::new(self.allow_private_network)))
;
if std::env::var_os("SSL_CERT_FILE").is_some()
|| std::env::var_os("SSL_CERT_DIR").is_some()
{
for certificate in configured_root_certificates() {
builder = builder.add_root_certificate(certificate.clone());
}
}
if let Some(ref proxy) = self.proxy_url {
if let Ok(p) = reqwest::Proxy::all(proxy.as_str()) {
builder = builder.proxy(p);
}
}
builder.build().expect("failed to build HTTP client")
}).await
}
/// Clone the request client owned by this browser context.
///
/// Scripted fetch/XHR uses the same pool as navigation instead of a
/// process-global client. This keeps its async network state inside the
/// same ownership boundary as the V8 runtime (issue #453).
pub async fn request_client(&self) -> Client {
self.get_client().await.clone()
}
/// Read-only accessor for the proxy URL the client was configured with
/// (if any). Exposed so callers outside the `obscura-net` crate — notably
/// `op_fetch_url` in `obscura-js` (#139) — can route their own reqwest
/// requests through the same upstream proxy.
pub fn proxy_url(&self) -> Option<&str> {
self.proxy_url.as_deref()
}
pub async fn fetch(&self, url: &Url) -> Result<Response, ObscuraNetError> {
self.fetch_with_method(Method::GET, url, None, None).await
}
/// `fetch` that also fires the page's passive on_request/on_response
/// callbacks (issue #408: callbacks are page-scoped, so the page-driven
/// fetch paths pass their registry in).
pub async fn fetch_with_callbacks(
&self,
url: &Url,
callbacks: Option<&CallbackRegistry>,
) -> Result<Response, ObscuraNetError> {
self.fetch_with_method(Method::GET, url, None, callbacks).await
}
pub async fn post_form(&self, url: &Url, body: &str) -> Result<Response, ObscuraNetError> {
self.fetch_with_method(Method::POST, url, Some(body.as_bytes().to_vec()), None).await
}
/// `post_form` variant of `fetch_with_callbacks`.
pub async fn post_form_with_callbacks(
&self,
url: &Url,
body: &str,
callbacks: Option<&CallbackRegistry>,
) -> Result<Response, ObscuraNetError> {
self.fetch_with_method(Method::POST, url, Some(body.as_bytes().to_vec()), callbacks)
.await
}
pub async fn fetch_with_method(
&self,
initial_method: Method,
url: &Url,
initial_body: Option<Vec<u8>>,
callbacks: Option<&CallbackRegistry>,
) -> Result<Response, ObscuraNetError> {
validate_url(url, self.allow_private_network)?;
if url.scheme() == "file" {
return fetch_file_url(url).await;
}
let mut method = initial_method;
let mut body = initial_body;
if self.block_trackers {
if let Some(host) = url.host_str() {
if crate::blocklist::is_blocked(host) {
tracing::debug!("Blocked tracker: {}", url);
return Ok(Response {
status: 0,
url: url.clone(),
headers: HashMap::new(),
body: Vec::new(),
redirected_from: Vec::new(),
});
}
}
}
let mut current_url = url.clone();
let mut redirects = Vec::new();
let max_redirects = 20;
for _redirect_count in 0..max_redirects {
let request_info = RequestInfo {
url: current_url.clone(),
method: method.to_string(),
headers: self.extra_headers.read().await.clone(),
resource_type: ResourceType::Document,
};
if let Some(interceptor) = self.interceptor.read().await.as_ref() {
match interceptor.intercept(&request_info).await {
InterceptAction::Continue => {}
InterceptAction::Block => {
return Err(ObscuraNetError::Blocked(current_url.to_string()));
}
InterceptAction::Fulfill(response) => {
return Ok(response);
}
InterceptAction::ModifyHeaders(headers) => {
let mut extra = self.extra_headers.write().await;
extra.extend(headers);
}
}
}
if let Some(cbs) = callbacks {
cbs.fire_request(&request_info).await;
}
let ua = self.user_agent.read().await.clone();
let (sec_ch_ua, sec_ch_ua_platform) = chrome_client_hints(&ua);
let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
// Chrome's top-level navigation header order. (reqwest appends
// accept-encoding/host after these, so accept-encoding lands after
// accept-language rather than before it; the rest matches Chrome.)
headers.insert(
HeaderName::from_static("sec-ch-ua"),
HeaderValue::from_str(&sec_ch_ua)
.unwrap_or_else(|_| HeaderValue::from_static("\"Not:A-Brand\";v=\"99\", \"Google Chrome\";v=\"145\", \"Chromium\";v=\"145\"")),
);
headers.insert(HeaderName::from_static("sec-ch-ua-mobile"), HeaderValue::from_static("?0"));
headers.insert(
HeaderName::from_static("sec-ch-ua-platform"),
HeaderValue::from_str(&sec_ch_ua_platform)
.unwrap_or_else(|_| HeaderValue::from_static("\"Windows\"")),
);
headers.insert(HeaderName::from_static("upgrade-insecure-requests"), HeaderValue::from_static("1"));
headers.insert(USER_AGENT, HeaderValue::from_str(&ua).unwrap_or_else(|_| {
HeaderValue::from_static("Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/145.0.0.0 Safari/537.36")
}));
headers.insert(
reqwest::header::ACCEPT,
HeaderValue::from_static("text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7"),
);
headers.insert(HeaderName::from_static("sec-fetch-site"), HeaderValue::from_static("none"));
headers.insert(HeaderName::from_static("sec-fetch-mode"), HeaderValue::from_static("navigate"));
headers.insert(HeaderName::from_static("sec-fetch-user"), HeaderValue::from_static("?1"));
headers.insert(HeaderName::from_static("sec-fetch-dest"), HeaderValue::from_static("document"));
headers.insert(
reqwest::header::ACCEPT_LANGUAGE,
HeaderValue::from_static("en-US,en;q=0.9"),
);
let cookie_header = self.cookie_jar.get_cookie_header(&current_url);
tracing::debug!(
"Cookie header for {}: {} cookies ({} bytes)",
current_url.host_str().unwrap_or("?"),
cookie_header.split("; ").filter(|s| !s.is_empty()).count(),
cookie_header.len(),
);
if !cookie_header.is_empty() {
match HeaderValue::from_str(&cookie_header) {
Ok(val) => {
headers.insert(reqwest::header::COOKIE, val);
}
Err(_) => {
let filtered: String = cookie_header
.split("; ")
.filter(|pair| HeaderValue::from_str(pair).is_ok())
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
.join("; ");
if !filtered.is_empty() {
if let Ok(val) = HeaderValue::from_str(&filtered) {
headers.insert(reqwest::header::COOKIE, val);
}
}
tracing::debug!(
"Cookie header invalid chars, filtered {} -> {} bytes",
cookie_header.len(), filtered.len(),
);
}
}
}
for (k, v) in self.extra_headers.read().await.iter() {
if let (Ok(name), Ok(val)) = (
HeaderName::from_bytes(k.as_bytes()),
HeaderValue::from_str(v),
) {
headers.insert(name, val);
}
}
let mut req_builder = self.get_client().await.request(method.clone(), current_url.as_str())
.headers(headers);
if let Some(ref b) = body {
if method == Method::POST {
req_builder = req_builder.header(
reqwest::header::CONTENT_TYPE,
"application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
);
}
req_builder = req_builder.body(b.clone());
}
self.in_flight.fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
let resp = req_builder.send().await.map_err(|e| {
self.in_flight.fetch_sub(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
ObscuraNetError::Network(format!("{}: {}", current_url, e))
})?;
self.in_flight.fetch_sub(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed);
let status = resp.status();
for val in resp.headers().get_all(reqwest::header::SET_COOKIE) {
if let Ok(s) = val.to_str() {
self.cookie_jar.set_cookie(s, &current_url);
}
}
let response_headers: HashMap<String, String> = resp
.headers()
.iter()
.map(|(k, v)| (k.as_str().to_lowercase(), v.to_str().unwrap_or("").to_string()))
.collect();
if status.is_redirection() {
if let Some(location) = resp.headers().get(reqwest::header::LOCATION) {
let location_str = location.to_str().map_err(|_| {
ObscuraNetError::Network("Invalid redirect Location header".into())
})?;
let next_url = current_url.join(location_str).map_err(|e| {
ObscuraNetError::Network(format!("Invalid redirect URL: {}", e))
})?;
validate_url(&next_url, self.allow_private_network)?;
redirects.push(current_url.clone());
current_url = next_url;
if status == reqwest::StatusCode::MOVED_PERMANENTLY
|| status == reqwest::StatusCode::FOUND
|| status == reqwest::StatusCode::SEE_OTHER
{
method = Method::GET;
body = None;
}
continue;
}
}
let body_bytes = resp.bytes().await.map_err(|e| {
ObscuraNetError::Network(format!("Failed to read body: {}", e))
})?.to_vec();
let response = Response {
url: current_url,
status: status.as_u16(),
headers: response_headers,
body: body_bytes,
redirected_from: redirects,
};
if let Some(cbs) = callbacks {
cbs.fire_response(&request_info, &response).await;
}
return Ok(response);
}
Err(ObscuraNetError::TooManyRedirects(current_url.to_string()))
}
pub async fn set_user_agent(&self, ua: &str) {
*self.user_agent.write().await = ua.to_string();
}
pub async fn set_extra_headers(&self, headers: HashMap<String, String>) {
*self.extra_headers.write().await = headers;
}
pub fn active_requests(&self) -> u32 {
self.in_flight.load(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::Relaxed)
}
pub fn is_network_idle(&self) -> bool {
self.active_requests() == 0
}
}
impl Default for ObscuraHttpClient {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::new()
}
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum ObscuraNetError {
#[error("Network error: {0}")]
Network(String),
#[error("Too many redirects: {0}")]
TooManyRedirects(String),
#[error("Request blocked: {0}")]
Blocked(String),
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod ssrf_tests {
use super::{is_forbidden_ip, validate_url, ObscuraHttpClient, SsrfGuardResolver};
use crate::cookies::CookieJar;
use reqwest::dns::{Name, Resolve};
use std::net::IpAddr;
use std::str::FromStr;
use std::sync::Arc;
use url::Url;
fn ip(s: &str) -> IpAddr {
IpAddr::from_str(s).unwrap()
}
#[test]
fn ipv4_private_and_special_ranges_are_forbidden() {
for s in [
"127.0.0.1",
"127.5.6.7",
"10.0.0.1",
"172.16.0.1",
"192.168.1.1",
"169.254.169.254", // cloud-metadata endpoint
"0.0.0.0", // unspecified -> localhost (was a bypass)
"255.255.255.255", // broadcast
"192.0.2.1", // documentation
] {
assert!(is_forbidden_ip(ip(s)), "{s} should be forbidden");
}
}
#[test]
fn public_ipv4_is_allowed() {
for s in ["1.1.1.1", "8.8.8.8", "93.184.216.34"] {
assert!(!is_forbidden_ip(ip(s)), "{s} should be allowed");
}
}
#[test]
fn ipv6_loopback_ula_linklocal_and_mapped_are_forbidden() {
for s in [
"::1", // loopback
"::", // unspecified
"fc00::1", // unique-local (was a bypass)
"fd12:3456:789a::1", // unique-local
"fe80::1", // link-local
"::ffff:127.0.0.1", // v4-mapped loopback (was a bypass)
"::ffff:169.254.169.254", // v4-mapped metadata
] {
assert!(is_forbidden_ip(ip(s)), "{s} should be forbidden");
}
}
#[test]
fn public_ipv6_is_allowed() {
assert!(!is_forbidden_ip(ip("2606:4700:4700::1111"))); // cloudflare dns
}
#[test]
fn validate_url_blocks_unspecified_and_allows_public() {
// 0.0.0.0 previously slipped through validate_url's literal-host check.
assert!(validate_url(&Url::parse("http://0.0.0.0:8080/").unwrap(), false).is_err());
assert!(validate_url(&Url::parse("http://127.0.0.1/").unwrap(), false).is_err());
assert!(validate_url(&Url::parse("http://example.com/").unwrap(), false).is_ok());
// The allow flag bypasses the guard (local-dev escape hatch).
assert!(validate_url(&Url::parse("http://127.0.0.1/").unwrap(), true).is_ok());
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn resolver_blocks_hostname_that_resolves_to_loopback() {
// localtest.me is a public DNS name that resolves to 127.0.0.1 — the
// canonical DNS-rebinding test. The guard must reject it. If DNS is
// unavailable the lookup itself errors (also Err), so the assertion
// holds either way.
let r = SsrfGuardResolver::new(false);
let res = r.resolve(Name::from_str("localtest.me").unwrap()).await;
assert!(res.is_err(), "localtest.me -> 127.0.0.1 must be blocked");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn resolver_does_not_ssrf_block_public_host() {
// A public host must not be SSRF-blocked. Tolerate a no-network sandbox
// by only failing on an actual SSRF rejection, not a lookup failure.
let r = SsrfGuardResolver::new(false);
match r.resolve(Name::from_str("example.com").unwrap()).await {
Ok(_) => {}
Err(e) => assert!(
!e.to_string().contains("SSRF blocked"),
"example.com wrongly SSRF-blocked: {e}"
),
}
}
/// Mint a throwaway CA plus a 127.0.0.1 leaf it signed, and serve one
/// canned HTTPS response with the leaf on an ephemeral port. Returns the
/// port and the CA certificate as PEM.
async fn https_fixture_with_private_ca() -> (u16, String) {
use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
let ca_key = rcgen::KeyPair::generate().unwrap();
let mut ca_params = rcgen::CertificateParams::new(Vec::new()).unwrap();
ca_params.is_ca = rcgen::IsCa::Ca(rcgen::BasicConstraints::Unconstrained);
let ca_cert = ca_params.self_signed(&ca_key).unwrap();
let leaf_key = rcgen::KeyPair::generate().unwrap();
let leaf_params =
rcgen::CertificateParams::new(vec!["127.0.0.1".to_string()]).unwrap();
let leaf_cert = leaf_params.signed_by(&leaf_key, &ca_cert, &ca_key).unwrap();
let certs = vec![tokio_rustls::rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer::from(
leaf_cert.der().to_vec(),
)];
let key = tokio_rustls::rustls::pki_types::PrivateKeyDer::Pkcs8(
tokio_rustls::rustls::pki_types::PrivatePkcs8KeyDer::from(
leaf_key.serialize_der(),
),
);
let config = tokio_rustls::rustls::ServerConfig::builder()
.with_no_client_auth()
.with_single_cert(certs, key)
.unwrap();
let acceptor = tokio_rustls::TlsAcceptor::from(Arc::new(config));
let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
let port = listener.local_addr().unwrap().port();
tokio::spawn(async move {
while let Ok((stream, _)) = listener.accept().await {
let acceptor = acceptor.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
let Ok(mut tls) = acceptor.accept(stream).await else {
return; // Handshake rejection is the point of one test.
};
let mut buf = [0u8; 1024];
let _ = tls.read(&mut buf).await;
let body = "private ca ok";
let resp = format!(
"HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\ncontent-type: text/plain\r\ncontent-length: {}\r\nconnection: close\r\n\r\n{}",
body.len(),
body
);
let _ = tls.write_all(resp.as_bytes()).await;
let _ = tls.shutdown().await;
});
}
});
(port, ca_cert.pem())
}
// The two configured-roots tests set/rely on SSL_CERT_FILE, which is
// cached once per process at client build. They are only correct under
// `cargo nextest` (one process per test), the same constraint the whole
// workspace already has.
#[tokio::test]
async fn configured_roots_trust_a_private_ca_via_ssl_cert_file() {
let (port, ca_pem) = https_fixture_with_private_ca().await;
let ca_file = tempfile::NamedTempFile::new().unwrap();
std::fs::write(ca_file.path(), ca_pem).unwrap();
std::env::set_var("SSL_CERT_FILE", ca_file.path());
let client =
ObscuraHttpClient::with_full_options(Arc::new(CookieJar::new()), None, true);
let url = Url::parse(&format!("https://127.0.0.1:{port}/")).unwrap();
let resp = client.fetch(&url).await.expect("private CA in SSL_CERT_FILE must be trusted");
assert_eq!(resp.status, 200);
assert_eq!(resp.text(), "private ca ok");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn configured_roots_trust_a_private_ca_via_ssl_cert_dir() {
let (port, ca_pem) = https_fixture_with_private_ca().await;
let ca_dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
std::fs::write(ca_dir.path().join("private-ca.pem"), ca_pem).unwrap();
std::env::set_var("SSL_CERT_DIR", ca_dir.path());
let client =
ObscuraHttpClient::with_full_options(Arc::new(CookieJar::new()), None, true);
let url = Url::parse(&format!("https://127.0.0.1:{port}/")).unwrap();
let resp = client
.fetch(&url)
.await
.expect("private CA in SSL_CERT_DIR must be trusted");
assert_eq!(resp.status, 200);
assert_eq!(resp.text(), "private ca ok");
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn private_ca_is_still_rejected_without_ssl_cert_file() {
// The same fixture that the SSL_CERT_FILE test trusts must fail here. The
// listener is reachable (same setup), so an Err can only be TLS.
let (port, _ca_pem) = https_fixture_with_private_ca().await;
let client =
ObscuraHttpClient::with_full_options(Arc::new(CookieJar::new()), None, true);
let url = Url::parse(&format!("https://127.0.0.1:{port}/")).unwrap();
assert!(client.fetch(&url).await.is_err(), "unknown CA must be rejected");
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod cert_env_tests {
use super::custom_cert_store_requested;
use std::ffi::OsStr;
#[test]
fn empty_ssl_cert_env_is_treated_as_unset() {
// Set-but-empty must NOT request a custom store: for the stealth client
// that would replace the webpki roots with a near-empty default-paths
// store and break all HTTPS.
assert!(!custom_cert_store_requested(Some(OsStr::new("")), None));
assert!(!custom_cert_store_requested(None, Some(OsStr::new(""))));
assert!(!custom_cert_store_requested(
Some(OsStr::new("")),
Some(OsStr::new(""))
));
// Genuinely unset: no custom store.
assert!(!custom_cert_store_requested(None, None));
// Set and non-empty: build the custom store (behavior unchanged).
assert!(custom_cert_store_requested(
Some(OsStr::new("/etc/corp/ca.pem")),
None
));
assert!(custom_cert_store_requested(
None,
Some(OsStr::new("/etc/ssl/certs"))
));
}
}