The #525 fix landed on the reqwest path (`client.rs`: `configured_root_paths()`
-> `add_root_certificate`) but did not cover `wreq_client.rs`. The stealth
client builds its `wreq::Client` without a certificate store, so those
variables are silently ignored whenever `--stealth` is on.
The consequence is inverted: the transport with the best TLS fingerprint is the
only one that cannot reach a host behind a private or incomplete CA chain --
precisely the environments #525 described.
Same binary on current main, same private-CA server, only the flag differs:
SSL_CERT_FILE=ca.pem obscura fetch https://127.0.0.1:8443/ -> ok
SSL_CERT_FILE=ca.pem obscura --stealth fetch https://127.0.0.1:8443/ -> fails
`wreq` already exposes the hook -- `ClientBuilder::tls_cert_store(CertStore)`,
and `CertStore::builder().set_default_paths()` reads both variables. It is
simply never called.
Two constraints, both of which fail silently if got wrong:
* `tls_cert_store`, not `tls_options`. `emulation()` is documented as
"This will overwrite the existing configuration" and internally calls
`self.tls_options(emulation.tls_options)`; setting TLS options here would
discard the Chrome fingerprint, which is the whole point of this client.
`tls_cert_store` is a separate config field and composes with emulation.
* Opt-in only. Supplying a store REPLACES the webpki roots (see
`set_cert_store` in `tls/conn/ext.rs`), it does not add to them. Applying it
unconditionally would break ordinary sites whenever the bundle is
incomplete. With neither variable set, behaviour is byte-for-byte unchanged.
Verified: with the variable, a private-CA host resolves under --stealth;
without it, the same host still fails; with a deliberately EMPTY bundle,
example.com fails -- which is what proves the store is actually applied rather
than the bundle merely happening to be right.
Refs #538, #525
Diego Cavalcante
fb42229200